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Spectrum sensing is the first step to overcome the spectrum scarcity problem in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) wherein all
unutilized subbands in the radio environment are explored for better spectrum utilization. Adversary nodes can threaten these
spectrum sensing results by launching passive and active attacks that prevent legitimate nodes from using the spectrum efficiently.
Securing the spectrum sensing process has become an important issue in CRNs in order to ensure reliable and secure spectrum
sensing and fair management of resources. In this paper, a novel collaborative approach during spectrum sensing process is
proposed. It monitors the behavior of sensing nodes and identifies the malicious and misbehaving sensing nodes. The proposed
approach measures the node’s sensing reliability using a value called belief level. All the sensing nodes are grouped into a specific
number of clusters. In each cluster, a sensing node is selected as a cluster head that is responsible for collecting sensing-reputation
reports from different cognitive nodes about each node in the same cluster. The cluster head analyzes information to monitor and
judge the nodes’ behavior. By simulating the proposed approach, we showed its importance and its efficiency for achieving better
spectrum security by mitigating multiple passive and active attacks.
1. Introduction
In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), as most of the spec-
trum is assigned to specific users known as licensed users
(primary users (PUs)), the most important challenge is to
share the licensed spectrum between the licensed users (PUs)
and the unlicensed users (secondary users (SUs)) when the
PUs are inactive [1].
Cognitive radio techniques provide the capability to use
or share the spectrum in an opportunistic manner. The SUs
have to detect the unused spectrum bands, which are known
as spectrumholes, and this process is called spectrum sensing
[2]. Spectrum sensing is recognized as the basic functionality
provided by CR. In the spectrum sensing process, the SUs
continue to monitor the channel(s) that are owned by the
PU(s). Once a channel is available, the SUs can start to
use it. Failing to sense the spectrum correctly might cause
substantial interference for those that use the spectrum and
therefore may lead to inefficient spectrum utilization. When
the conditions of a CRN are more dynamic, collaborative
sensing helps to detect spectrum holes faster [3]. The detec-
tion probability to obtain correct sensing results is increased
when the cooperation concept is applied among the different
secondary users. Additionally, cooperative spectrum sensing
alleviates the negative impacts on performance caused by
multipath fading and shadowing [2]. Every cognitive user
that participates in the cooperative spectrum sensing first
senses the spectrum using any spectrum sensing method
such as matched filter, energy detection, or cyclostationary
feature detection [4]. This is followed by the exchange of
their initial detection decisions and making the final sensing
decision based on all the nodes’ sensing results.
As in any other type of wireless networks, CRNs are
vulnerable to many security attacks (both passive and active)
especially during the spectrum sensing phase. The radio
technology itself is vulnerable to attacks, since any radio
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frequency can be blocked or jammed if a transmitter sends
a signal at the same frequency with enough power. There
is no control over the behavior of these unlicensed users,
which threatens the security of the licensed users. The most
important behaviors of attackers can be categorized into the
following: (i) misbehaving, (ii) selfish, (iii) cheating, or (iv)
malicious [5]. Amisbehaving user does not obey the rules set
in the network by an authority entity. A selfish user wants to
keep the network resources for its ownuse and it does not care
about other network users if they benefit from the network
or not. A cheating user does not give true information about
the network resources on purpose to increase its quality
of service (QoS). A malicious user intentionally targets the
network on purpose to degrade the other nodes QoS and the
network efficiency. If a node behaves in one of the previous
categories, the node will be an adversary node and it might
launch multiple attacks. An attacker that behaves in one of
these ways during spectrum sensing can emulate PUs or send
false sensing results.The attacker aims to prevent other nodes
from using the spectrum efficiently, keep network resources
for its own benefits, reduce the quality of service (QoS) of
other nodes, and therefore degrade the network security and
performance.
As security is an important issue in the context of
any wireless network as well as in CRN, researchers have
moved their interest towards it [6]. New attacks have been
introduced, which are unique to CRNs especially during
spectrum sensing process, whereas malicious nodes use the
vulnerability of the CR reliability issues to attack a CRN.The
attack is active as long as a network node is behaving in any of
the attacker behaviors and is affecting the network security.
Otherwise, the attack is passive and the network node is
waiting for a chance to switch to an active attack. Addressing
passive attacker behavior or attacks is important as it is
considered a proactive solution to prevent such behavior or
such attacks from switching to active attacks if they have the
chance to do so. Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA)
in [7–10] and Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attack
(SSDF) in [11–13] are two examples of attacks, which are
unique to CRN. These attacks occur during the spectrum
sensing phase. They are results of the different attacker
behaviors and they both can be passive or active. PUEA is
an active attack when a malicious node is emulating a PU,
while other nodes are unable to detect it before making their
own sensing decision. PUEA is a passive attack when other
nodes can detect themalicious node beforemaking their own
sensing decision. SSDF is an active attack if a node sends false
sensing results to the other nodes in the network, and they
consider its false sensing results in making their own sensing
decision. SSDF is a passive attack if its sensing results are
not considered in making the final sensing decision. Unlike
most researchers who have focused on addressing the active
attacks individually, Althunibat et al. and Sucasas et al. have
addressed mutable attacks simultaneously [14, 15]. They have
analyzed PUEA and SSDF in their active state. To the best
of our knowledge, the attacker behaviors that may lead to
passive and active attacks, which may launch more than one
attack at the same time, have not been studied.
Table 1: The relationship between attacks and adversary nodes
behavior.
Attack name Adversary node behavior
PUEA Misbehaving, malicious, and cheating
SSDF Misbehaving, cheating, and selfish
DoS Misbehaving, malicious, selfish, and cheating
Collusion Misbehaving, selfish, malicious, and cheating
Objective function Misbehaving and malicious
There are other attacks addressed in other types of wire-
less networks such as DoS, collusion, and objective function
attacks [6] that can be launched in CRNs as a result of PUEA
and/or SSDF attacks. In the DoS attack, the adversary node
acts normally in the network to gain the trust of the other
nodes and then targets the network by behaving in one
of the attacker behavior categories. The DoS attack is an
active attack. Another form of the DoS attack is when the
adversary node emulates a PU signal (i.e., launches PUEA)
to force other nodes to vacate the spectrum. The DoS attack
[16] results in degrading other nodes quality of service
(QoS). In the collusion attack,multiple adversary nodes agree
on targeting benign node(s) in order to eliminate normal
behaving nodes. During this time, adversary nodes keep
the network resources for their own use. In the objective
function attack, one ormultiple adversary nodes try to change
the radio parameters (e.g., center frequency, bandwidth, or
modulation). Addressing such attacks is important in CRNs
especially during the spectrum sensing phase as it results
in improving network performance, security, and spectrum
utilization.
Any attack is a result of an attackers’ behavior. Therefore,
mitigating the attackers’ behavior will lead to detect and
mitigate fewer simultaneous attacks without addressing the
attacks themselves.
In Table 1, we show the different attacks that might be
launched as a result of one or multiple adversary nodes
behaviors.
In this paper and in [17, 18], the attackers’ behaviors rather
than the attacks themselves are addressed for the first time in
CRNs. It was not considered before in the literature of CRN
security. In [17], we proposed an approach for monitoring
nodes’ behavior during the spectrum sensing process, and
in [18], we used it to propose a novel and secure routing
algorithm. By mitigating the attacker’s behavior(s), we can
mitigate multiple attacks while they are active or passive.
The proposed approach is an interweave approach (i.e., it
is an opportunistic spectrum access approach), wherein the
different SUs keep monitoring the spectrum band to find the
opportunity to access it when the PUs are absent. Meanwhile,
the SUs have to leave the spectrum band upon the presence
of PUs. We use the concept of reputation-based mitigation
systems which have been recently addressed by researchers in
CRN and wireless sensor networks (WSN) [19–21] andmerge
it with the cooperative spectrum sensing in order to monitor
the behavior of the nodes participating in the spectrum
sensing process.
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We propose a collaborative approach that monitors
nodes’ behavior in order to identify and penalize malicious
andmisbehaving node(s) during the spectrum sensing phase.
Each sensing node is assigned a value called belief level (BL),
which is used to describe their reliability in making the final
sensing decision. During the spectrum sensing phase, each
network node senses the spectrum and then forwards its
sensing decision to its neighbors and to a central point within
the cluster namely cluster head (CH). The behavior of the
sensing nodes is monitored by each other and it is reported to
the CH that analyzes them in order to penalize the adversary
node(s) and reward the normal behaving node(s). We secure
the messages sent between the different network nodes by
encrypting them using the symmetric key cryptography,
which has many advantages such as its straightforwardness,
its less memory occupation, its less memory use, and its
less power utilization [22]. Permitting only normal behaving
sensing nodes to participate in the spectrum sensing process
and to access the network resources helps to fairly share
and manage the network resources, hence improving the
spectrum security and utilization.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
(i) To the best of our knowledge, it is the first work
in CRN security that focuses on addressing the
adversary nodes’ behaviors, instead of focusing on the
attacks, themselves. By doing so,
(a) multiple attacks other than just PUEA and SSDF
attacks, such as DoS, collusion, and objective
function attacks, are mitigated;
(b) the proposed approach works as a reactive
approach to active attacks and as a proactive
approach to passive attacks;
(c) the proposed approach increases the probability
of detecting adversary nodes, which improves
the spectrum utilization.
(ii) Two additional metrics, the false alarm and detection
probability, used for showing the performance of the
proposed approach have been added and compared
with other state-of-the-art models.
(iii) The proposed approach increases the probability
of detecting vacant spectrum channels and it also
decreases the false alarm probability.
(iv) It secures the sensing-reputation reports exchanged
between the different sensing nodes by encrypting
the messages carrying them through the public and
symmetric key cryptography.
(v) A new 𝐾-rule is proposed. It helps in making the
sensing process faster and more secure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: a literature
review is conducted in Section 2. The threat model is shown
in Section 3. Section 4 shows the proposed approach in detail.
Section 5 presents the complexity analysis of the proposed
approach. In Section 6, the proposed approach is simulated
and its performance is evaluated and compared to other
models. We analyze the proposed approach from the security
perspective andwe show the different attacks that it can detect
and mitigate in Section 7. We conclude the paper and show
future directions in Section 8.
2. Related Work
During the spectrum sensing phase, PUEA and SSDF attacks
are the main attacks that affect the accuracy of the spectrum
sensing results. Both of these attacks can perform in an
active or passive way. Detection and mitigation of these two
attacks have received considerable attention from researchers
in CRNs.
In PUEA, an attacker may modify their air interface as
it emulates the primary user’s signal characteristics [15]. In
this attack, other secondary users SUs will falsely determine
that the frequency is in use by a legitimate primary user
while in real it is not. Therefore, if the other SUs vacate the
frequency accordingly, PUEA is considered an active attack;
otherwise it is a passive attack. The following research work
addresses the active PUEA. In [23], a robust technique for
spectrum sensing process is proposed based on the principal
component analysis to find any attack targeting the network.
A detectionmethod of PUEA is proposed in [24]. A sequence
of steps is followed by all secondary users in the network
until the adversary nodes are eliminated from the spectrum
sensing process. In [25], the different SUs in the network
send the sensing information to a fusion center, which uses
estimation algorithms to differentiate the primary user from
the attacker. A new scheme, namely, INCA, for detecting
PUEA in decentralized cognitive radio ad hoc networks is
described in [26]. All SUs cooperate with each other to
identify the node(s) that emulate PU as they broadcast the
probability of PU’s presence to each other. This probability
is calculated based on some predetermined criteria such as
the received signal strength, transmission power, distance,
noise, and/or transmission rate. Despite the improvement of
the detection probability that INCA showed the maximum
value of the detection probability that can be reached is 0.5,
which is relatively not enough to rely on this mechanism.
In SSDF attack, the attackers participate in the sensing
process by sharing wrong sensing with the other nodes in
the network. By doing so, the attackers aim to selfishly keep
the network resources for themselves only or the attackers
may aim to disrupt the network throughput for other reasons.
The following research addresses the active SSDF. In [27],
a mitigation method for SSDF attack is proposed. During
the sensing process, all the network nodes including the
malicious ones and the other SUs make their own decisions
about the presence/absence of PUs in their bands, and
then those decisions are forwarded to a central point called
fusion center. The fusion center counts the number of times
each node has the right decision about the PU, which is
referred to as measure. The node’s observations accuracy
increases, as the measure value increases. The sensing results
of the nodes that have a higher value of measure will be
excluded from the following sensing iteration. In [28], the
authors develop a malicious user detection algorithm that
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calculates the suspicious level of secondary users and then
utilizes the suspicious level to eliminate the malicious users’
influence on the primary user detection results. An attack-
tolerant distributed sensing protocol that selectively filters
out abnormal sensor reports and maintains the accuracy
of incumbent detection is explained in [29]. The key idea
behind this mechanism is that the measured primary signal
strength at nearby sensors should be correlated due to
shadow fading. The authors in [30] analyze a challenging
attack scenario, wherein multiple cooperative attackers can
overhear the honest SU sensing reports and the honest SUs
are unaware of the existence of attackers. In [12], the authors
use similarity degree to measure the evidence reliability of
different users. A low reliability indicates amalicious user and
therefore, it will be excluded from the fusion center (FC)’s
final decision about the spectrum. The authors in [31] use a
bioinformatics algorithm to propose a cooperative spectrum
sensing approach.The sensing nodes which sensed spectrum
multiple times in one allocated sensing time slot forward their
sensing results to a fusion center that compares them using
the bioinformatics algorithm. Based on the comparison, a
similarity index is computed for each CR user. CR users with
similarity indices below a threshold are declared malicious,
while in [32], a principal-agent-based joint spectrum sensing
and access framework is proposed to thwart the malicious
behaviors of malicious users in CR networks.
There are many limitations in previous work. First, the
PUEA and SSDF attacks are addressed individually (i.e., no
previous work has considered both the attacks happening
at the same time except for PUEA and SSDF happening
simultaneously in [14, 15]). It is important to address these
attacks together to improve the network performance because
their detrimental effects are greater when the attacks occur
simultaneously. Second, researchers focused on addressing
the PUEA and SSDF attacks in their active state and none
of them have studied these two attacks in their passive
state. Addressing active PUEA and SSDF attacks works as a
reactive solution to attacks that are actually occurring and
degrading the network performance. However, addressing
the passive attacks, which works as a proactive solution,
leads to eliminating attacks before they occur and affect
the network performance. Third, the messages carrying the
sensing results are exchanged between the different sensing
nodes in an unencrypted way, which opens the doors widely
and makes it easier for adversary nodes to overhear and
capture the sensing results and consequently, launchmultiple
active attacks. Fourth, the previous reputation-based systems
are not resilient to such attackswhen the number of adversary
nodes in the network is high. Moreover, in other reputation-
based mechanisms, the sensing reports lack the identities
of the senders; therefore, more work is needed by the node
that analyzes those sensing report to distinguish whether
the reports are sent from trusted sensing nodes or adversary
nodes, which implies higher energy consumption levels and
higher communication and computation overhead.
The authors in [14, 15] propose a model that takes in
consideration simultaneous PUEA and SSDF active attacks.
Their model is a lightweight cryptographic algorithm that
provides authentication and integrity to SUs’ reports. Each
node sends its sensing results to an FC encrypted with a
variable number of security bits, which depends on how
certain the node is about its sensing result. Despite the impor-
tance of this work, it has disadvantages. This work focuses
more on authenticating the sent sensing result and it does
not consider the cases when a sensing node sends a wrong
sensing result through a correct authenticated message. In
other words, their main focus is on the reporting nodes
not on the contents of the sensing reports. Moreover, they
considered the adversary nodes fromoutside the network and
not the nodes that are already part of the network waiting
for the opportunity to target the other network nodes. In
these cases, wrong sensing result will be considered correct.
Moreover, it does not provide a solution for the case when
collusive nodes agree on sending false sensing results, and
therefore, the SSDF attack is not mitigated in this case.
In our work in [17, 18] and in this paper, we address the
limitations of the previous work by proposing an approach
that considers the attackers’ behavior rather than the attacks
themselves during spectrum sensing phase. In addition, the
proposed approach works as a proactive solution to passive
attacks and a reactive solution to active attacks. The simu-
lation results show that the proposed approach outperforms
other state-of-the-art approaches. The key elements added to
this proposed work that were not mentioned in our work in
[17, 18] can be summarized as follows:
(a) The process of analyzing the sensing-reputation
reports by the CH has been explained and showed all
possible cases.
(b) A novel algorithm for finding the final decision about
the spectrum sensing result has been proposed.
(c) Two additional metrics used for showing the perfor-
mance of the proposed approach have been added
and compared with other state-of-the-art models.
The analyses of these metrics, the false alarm and
detection probability, have been explained step by
step and showed its effect to the proposed approach.
(d) The complexity analysis of the proposed approach has
been investigated, specifically the computation and
the communication overhead.
(e) The attacks have been analyzed from the attacker
behavior prospective, which is a new contribution.No
previous works have addressed the attacker behavior.
They focused on mitigating the attacks themselves.
Moreover, the threat model in our system has been
identified and described.
(f) The nodes’ behavior has been categorized into four
categories based on the nodes BL value, which eases
the analysis process of the nodes behavior.
(g) A novel𝐾-rule has been proposed. It helps in making
the sensing process faster and more secure. The
impact of this novel𝐾-rule has been illustrated in the
simulation results.
(h) The contents of the sensing-reputation report have
been expanded to also include the sensing decision.
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(i) The related work has been expanded to cover all state-
of-the-art mechanisms used for detecting the attacks
that might occur during the sensing process.
3. The Threat Model
In our system, an abnormal node might behave in one or
more of the four different behavior categories (ways) to
threaten the network in order to degrade the network security
and performance. The threat model will be as follows:
(i) A node behaves in a malicious, misbehaving, cheat-
ing, and/or selfish way to launch PUE attack by
emulating one PU through sending signals over the
spectrum channels.
(ii) A node behaves in a malicious, misbehaving, cheat-
ing, and/or selfish way to launch SSDF attack by
sending false sensing results to other nodes.
(iii) Multiple collusive nodes behave in a malicious, mis-
behaving, cheating, and/or selfish way to launch
collusion attack by sending false reputation reports
about benign nodes aiming at degrading their QoS
and gaining exclusive access to the spectrum for
themselves.
(iv) One or multiple nodes may behave in a malicious,
misbehaving, cheating, and/or selfish way to launch
DoS attack by sending any data over the spectrum
channels in order to reduce the chance for other nodes
from using the spectrum for their data transmission.
(v) One or multiple adversary nodes may behave in
a malicious, misbehaving, cheating, and/or selfish
way to launch objective function attack by trying to
change the radio parameters such as center frequency,
bandwidth, power, modulation type, coding rate,
channel access protocol, encryption type, and frame
size in order to reduce the network performance and
security. There are three goals that the radio wants
to achieve: low power, high data rate, and secure
communication. Depending on the application, each
of these goals has a different weight. Therefore, the
adversary nodes try different combinations of input
parameters,measure the observed statistics such as bit
error rate, and then evaluate the objective functions
to see which inputs give the best results for their
application.
4. The Proposed Approach
The proposed approach is specific to CRN due to many
characteristics that it has. Firstly, any CR node can analyze
and learn information from its surrounding communication
environment about other users’ preferences and demands.
Secondly, it can reconfigure itself by adjusting system param-
eters conforming to certain policies and regulations. Last
but not least, a CR node can also initiate a negotiation
with other network nodes to enable more efficient spectrum
and network utilization. These characteristics are implicitly





Figure 1: System model.
4.1. Preface. Our system, as shown in Figure 1, is a network
that has 𝑀 secondary users (SUs) divided into 𝐾 clusters
based on their geographical locations as in [33].The details of
the clustering method and its constraints are out of the scope
of this paper. However, the authors in [33] summarized all
clustering metrics that can be applied in CRNs such as chan-
nel availability, geographical location, signal strength and
channel quality, and node degree.We assume the existence of
a node called fusion center (FC) that controls the traffic over
the network and manages the clusters. Each sensing node is
assigned a value called belief level (BL), which describes the
accuracy and reliability of the sensing nodes that participate
in making the final sensing decision. The belief level of each
node is the key element of the proposed approach as it will
be used to correctly monitor the sensing nodes’ behavior
and detect the adversary nodes during the spectrum sensing
phase. We assume four categories of trust and the BL has a
range of [0-4] based on these categories of trust as follows:
0 ≤ BL ≤ 1: Very_Untrusted
1 < BL < 2: Untrusted
2 ≤ BL < 3: Trusted
3 ≤ BL ≤ 4: Very_Trusted.
(1)
Each node is assigned an initial moderate belief level (BL)
of value equal to two; that is, it is in the “Trusted” category.
In each cluster, one node is chosen by the FC as a cluster
head (CH), which has the highest BL. At the time of cluster
formation any node is randomly chosen as a CH as all the
nodes have the same initial BL value.The cluster heads are not
fixed all the time; whenever, a new node is added to a cluster
and it has a higher BL than the current CH’s BL, the new node
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Cert.(CH)
Cert.((SU))
SU certificate generation 
and validation
CH certificate generation 
and validation
Cert.(SU), EncPKCH(IDSU, Security Cap., RSU, CID, MACSU)
EncPKSU(IDCH, RSU, RCH, SK1)
Spectrum sending, forwarding
sending results to neighboring nodes,
and preparing reputation reports
EncSK1(SURG, SR, SURD, Opinion, RCH, RSU)
Analysis of reputation reports
and making the ﬁnal decision
EncSK1(SRFD, RSU, RCH)
Figure 2: System sequence diagram.
will be selected as a CH.We assume that the energy detection
method is used by all SUs to detect the presence or absence of
the PU in its spectrumband.Note that the proposed approach
focuses on the analysis of the sensing result and thus it is
independent of the applied sensing method. The cooperative
spectrum sensing is done as in [34], wherein all the cluster
nodes sense the spectrum, make a decision about the PU
presence/absence, and forward their decision to other nodes.
To make the communication of the current nodes secure,
we assume that the communication between the network
nodes is completed with the public-key cryptography and
the symmetric key cryptography. Public-key cryptography is
used until a symmetric key is shared between the joining
node, the FC, and theCH.The symmetric keywill be assigned
to each node during the node’s authentication process. The
details of the authentication process will not be discussed in
this paper and are shown in [35]. Each node uses the same key
for encrypting and decrypting the messages in the spectrum
sensing phase. When a node sends a message to another
node in the network, this message will be encoded with the
symmetric key.Meanwhile, the receiver decodes thismessage
by using the same key.
The sequence diagram of the proposed approach is shown
in Figure 2 that starts with exchanging nodes certificates,
nodes IDs, and their security capabilities in order to keep
track of nodes IDs that participate in the sensing process,
followed by assigning symmetric keys to the sensing nodes
that will be used later for encrypting the sensing-reputation
reports. Next, the sensing nodes perform the sensing, mon-
itor other nodes’ behavior, prepare the sensing-reputation
reports, and forward them to the CH (Section 4.2). These
sensing-reputation reports are analyzed in each cluster by its
CH tomake the final decision about the spectrum availability
and the sensing nodes behavior. The CH then forwards the
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final sensing decisions to its cluster nodes (Section 4.3). All
cluster nodes are rewarded or penalized based on their behav-
ior in the cluster during the sensing process (Section 4.4).
4.2. Monitoring Nodes Behavior. All the clusters nodes per-
form the spectrum sensing process to find the vacant
spectrum channels by using any sensing method such as
the energy detection technique wherein each sensing node
measures the signal strengths in all PU’s channels, and by
using the energy detection method or any other sensing
methods, SUs make the initial binary decision about the
presence/absence of PU in its reserved channel(s). Each
sensing SU uses the preknown information about PUs signal
(such as signal power threshold and modulation type) and
compares it with the sensing signal in order to avoid PUEA.
If the received signal does not match the expected signal (i.e.,
a malicious node emulates PU), the sensing SU broadcasts
a message to all cluster nodes notifying them and therefore
PUEA is mitigated. However, if they match, it means a PU is
present in its spectrumchannels. If an SUdoes not receive any
signal over the sensing channel, it decides that the spectrum is
free and can be used. Each sensing node forwards its sensing
decision(s) to its neighbors, compares their sensing results
with its sensing results, prepares sensing-reputation reports
about their neighboring node(s), and forwards these reports
to the CH.
In case PUEA is avoided as mentioned earlier, each
sensing SU senses the spectrum and saves its sensing results
in a parameter called the sensing result (SR). It has two
values, either 0 for a free spectrum or 1 for an occupied
spectrum by a real PU. The sensing SU forwards its SR to its
neighboring nodes, which have their own SRs. Each sensing
node compares its own SR with the received SR from its
neighboring node and if they match, with the received SR
from its neighboring node and if they match, the sensing
node decides that its neighboring node is a “GOOD” node
G; otherwise it is a “BAD” node B.The sensing node does the
same for all its neighboring nodes.
4.3. Analyzing Nodes Behavior. Each node will keep mon-
itoring the behavior of its neighboring nodes and keep
sending periodic sensing-reputation reports to its CH about
their sensing results and their neighboring nodes’ behavior.
Sensing-reputation reports sent by each cluster node to its
CH have the following format (Reporting Node ID (RG) ‖
SRRG ‖ Reported Node ID (RD) ‖ Opinion) where SRRG
is the sensing result of the reporting node and it is either
0 (i.e., “Free” spectrum) or 1 (i.e., “Occupied” spectrum)
and Opinion is about the reported node (RD) and it is
either 0 (i.e., “BAD” node) or 1 (i.e., “GOOD” node). Note
that a reporting node is a reported node in its neighboring
nodes’ sensing-reputation reports and a reported node is a
reporting node in its own sensing-reputation report. CH is a
trustworthy node and it is the only node that can check the
correctness of the periodic sensing-reputation reports. Upon
the reception of the different sensing-reputation reports from
the different cluster nodes, CH analyzes these reports by
extracting the sensing result of the reporting nodes and their
opinion about the reliability of the reported nodes to make
the final decision about the spectrum availability and about
the nodes behavior.
The sensing-reputation reports analysis of making the
final sensing decision, SRFD, is described in Algorithm 1. CH
forms two groups of nodes occupied group (OG) and free
group (FG), where all the nodes in the same group have
the same sensing decision “occupied” or “free,” respectively.
CH analyzes the sensing-reputation reports received from
the trusted nodes in each group only. A trusted node is a
node that has its BL greater than or equal to a value called
BLthreshold, which describes the lower limit of a BL for a node
to be considered trusted.
CH makes the final decision about the spectrum avail-
ability based on the reports sent by different nodes and their
BL values and then forwards the final decision to its cluster
nodes. A specific rule is applied to process these reports in
order to make the final decision about the reported node.
The general rule of K-out-of-N rule is where 𝐾 users out of𝑁 users must have the same opinion in order to consider
their opinion. In case 50% 𝐾-rule is used, 𝐾 is equal to𝑁/2.
We propose a new𝐾-rule, where𝐾 represents the number of
votes and where we assign each user a different voting weight
based on its BL value.We apply the following criteria in order
to find the value of𝐾:
(i) A node’s decision with a BL value of 3 ≤ BL ≤ 4
counts as three votes.
(ii) A node’s decision with a BL value of 2.5 ≤ BL < 3
counts as two votes.
(iii) A node’s decision with a BL value of 2 ≤ BL < 2.5
counts as one vote.
(iv) A node’s decision with a BL value less than 2 does not
count.
The total votes’ number of the nodes, which have the same
sensing decision, has to fulfill the 50% 𝐾-rule (i.e., it has to
be greater than or equal to a value called𝑀threshold), which is
equal to half the number of the cluster nodes.
CH analyzes the sensing-reputation reports to determine
themalicious andmisbehaving reporting and reported nodes
as follows:
If the reporting node reports “GOOD” about the reported
node, one has the following:
(i) If (SRFD == SRRG && SRFD == SRRD), then it is a
true “GOOD” opinion→ both the reporting and the
reported node are trusted nodes.
(ii) If (SRFD! = SRRG && SRFD == SRRD), then it is
a true “GOOD” opinion → the reporting node is an
adversary node (SSDF attack).
(iii) If (SRFD == SRRG && SRFD! = SRRD), then it is
a false “GOOD” opinion → both the reporting and
the reported node are adversary nodes (SSDF and
Collusion attacks).
(iv) If (SRFD! = SRRG && SRFD! = SRRD), then it is
a false “GOOD” opinion → both the reporting and
the reported node are adversary nodes (SSDF and
Collusion attacks).
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Initialization
OG: All reporting nodes including CH that have SR = 1
FG: All reporting nodes including CH that have SR = 0𝐶: Number of SUs in a cluster
BLthreshold: Threshold value of the reporting node’s belief level𝑀threshold: Threshold value of the number of nodes that should
have the same sensing decision and is equal to ⌈𝐶/2⌉𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡: Votes count of reporting nodes that have SR = 1 and initialized to zero𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡: Votes count of reporting nodes that have SR = 0 and initialized to zero
SRFD: Final sensing decision𝐾Rule(BLRG𝑚 ): Function to calculate the votes count for each node𝐾: Total votes for all nodes and initialized to zero∀RG𝑖 ∈ OG𝐼𝐹 (BLRG𝑖 ≥ BLthreshold)𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡+ = 𝐾Rule(BLRG𝑖 )
======================∀RG𝑗 ∈ FG𝐼𝐹 (BLRG𝑗 ≥ BLthreshold)𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡+ = 𝐾Rule(BLRG𝑗 )
======================𝐼𝐹 (𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 ≥ 𝑀threshold && 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡> 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
SRFD = 1𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 (𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 ≥ 𝑀threshold && 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡> 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
SRFD = 0𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
SRFD = SRCH𝐾 = 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐾Rule(BLRG𝑚 ){ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 0;𝐼𝐹 3 ≤ BLRG𝑚 ≤ 4𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 3;𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 2.5 ≤ BLRG𝑚 < 3𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 2;𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 2 ≤ BLRG𝑚 < 2.5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 1;𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐼𝐹 BLRG𝑚 < 2𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 + 0;𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡;}
Algorithm 1: Final decision of spectrum sensing.
If the reporting node reports “BAD” about the reported
node, one has the following:
(i) If (SRFD == SRRG && SRFD == SRRD), then it is
a false “BAD” opinion → the reporting node is an
adversary node (Collusion attack).
(ii) If (SRFD! = SRRG && SRFD == SRRD), then it is
a false “BAD” opinion → the reporting node is an
adversary node (SSDF and Collusion attacks).
(iii) If (SRFD == SRRG && SRFD! = SRRD), then it is a true
“BAD” opinion→ the reported node is an adversary
node (SSDF and Collusion attacks).
(iv) If (SRFD! = SRRG && SRFD! = SRRD), then it is
a true “BAD” opinion → both the reporting and
the reported node are adversary nodes (SSDF and
Collusion attacks).
In summary, each node is given a variable weight of votes
based on its BL, and this variable votes’ weight affects
the final sensing results decision. The nodes behavior is
analyzed based on the final sensing results decision. Note
that we assume the channels carrying the sensing-reputation
reports are error-free and each sensing-reputation report has
a timestamp associated with it. If CH does not receive a
sensing-reputation report from a node within its timestamp,
CH considers the node as an adversary node. Moreover, if
a node is erroneously reporting or CH erroneously does
not consider one node’s reporting in one reporting round,
it will be considered in the following report round as the
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sensing-reputation reports analysis is a continuous process.
We assume that all the nodes can reach the CH and their
reports will be received by the CH as long as they were sent
within the timestamp.
4.4. Reward/Punishment Mechanism. CH adjusts the belief
level of each node based on whether a node is to be rewarded
or penalized. Each “GOOD” behaving node will be rewarded
by increasing its BL. Each “BAD” behaving node will be
penalized by decreasing its BL and applying a proper penalty
action according to a value called Adjustment Factor (AF)
that is calculated by CH as in (2) and then it is added to the
latest value of BL as in (3). AF is calculated according to the
number of “GOOD” and “BAD” reports sent by the reporting
nodes about the reported node.
at 𝑡 = 𝑡update






s.t. − 4 ≤ AF ≤ 4,
(2)
where 𝐺 and 𝐵 are the number of nodes, which decide that
SU𝑖 is a good and bad node, respectively. ∝ represents the
rewarding factor, 𝛽 represents the penalizing factor,N(BLSU𝑏)
represents the normalized belief level of the node, which
reports that SU𝑖 is a bad node, and N(BLSU𝑔) represents the
normalized belief level of the node, which reports that SU𝑖 is
a good node. The rewarding factor and the penalizing factor
are chosen as in real life where penalty has more weight than
rewarding.
The range of AF value is [−4, 4], i.e., if AF value is more
than 4, it will be set to 4 and if it is less than −4 it will be set
to −4. The BL of each reporting cluster node is important in
the process of finding the AF; the higher the BL of a reporting
cluster node is, the higher the effect on the AF value is.
Normal behaving sensing nodeswill be rewarded for their
normal behavior, which allows them to gain higher belief
level in the cluster. On the other hand, an adversary node
(attacker) is penalized by decrementing its BL and applying
penalty action(s) for its abnormal activity in the network.The
penalty mechanism affects the attacker throughput as that
decreases its belief level and reduces the resources assigned to
it, which therefore results in a low throughput. Consequently,
the desire of other cluster nodes to communicate with the
misbehaving node during data transmission phase is low;
hence, no node will want to behave in an abnormal way.
CH penalizes the adversary node by applying the proper
penalty actions according to the AF value. These penalty
actions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 shows the proposed penalty scheme, which
depends on other cluster nodes’ decision about each other.
Table 2: Penalty scheme.
Adjustment factor (AF) Penalty action(s)−1 < AF ≤ 0 No extra penalty−2 < AF ≤ −1 P1−3 < AF ≤ −2 P1 and P2−4 < AF ≤ −3 P3−4 P3 and P4
(i) P1: give a time out for three sensing rounds; (ii) P2: deallocate 50% of the
assigned resources to the adversary node; (iii) P3: deallocate all resources
and disconnect this adversary node; (iv) P4: mark the adversary node as an
undesirable node.
Equation (3) finds the updated value of belief level of each
cluster node at every reporting round, where (BLSU𝑖)𝑡update−1 is
the belief level in the previous updating round.
(BLSU𝑖)𝑡update = (AFSU𝑖) + (BLSU𝑖)𝑡update−1 . (3)
4.5. Analysis of Detection and False AlarmProbability. Weuse
the value of 𝐾 (calculated as in Algorithm 1) to formulate
the detection probability 𝑃BL𝐷 , which is the probability of
identifying a malicious reported node as malicious or the






(𝐶𝑖 )𝑃𝑑𝑖 (1 − 𝑃𝑑)𝐶−𝑖 , 𝐾 < 𝐶,1, 𝐾 ≥ 𝐶,
(4)
where 𝑃𝑑 denotes the individual detection probability of the
reporting node and 𝐶 is the number of SUs in each cluster.
A malicious reporting node is a node that sends false
reports toCHabout the reported node or false sensing results.
When CH receives the report from the reporting nodes, it
analyzes if the reporting node acts in a misbehaving way
either by sending false reputation report about the reported
node or by sending false sensing result. The probability for
CH to make a wrong decision about the reported node or
about the spectrum availability is denoted as 𝑃𝐹(𝐶,𝐾) as in
(5) where 𝑃𝑓 denotes the individual false alarm probability of
the reporting node, (i.e., it is the probability that the reporting
node erroneously transmits to the CH a false report about the





(𝐶𝑖 )𝑃𝑓𝑖 (1 − 𝑃𝑓)
𝐶−𝑖 , 𝐾 < 𝐶,
1, 𝐾 ≥ 𝐶.
(5)
A malicious reporting node (SU𝑧) will try to send false
reports to CH about the reported node or false sensing result
with a probability of success 𝑃SU𝑧𝑠 as in
𝑃SU𝑧𝑠 = BLSU𝑧BLmax ∗
12BV , (6)
where BLSU𝑧 is the belief level of themalicious reporting node
(SU𝑧) and BV is the number of bad votes about SU𝑧.
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The probability of false alarm using our mechanism can







[1 − 𝑃SU𝑧𝑠 ] 𝑃𝐹 (𝐶,𝐾) , (7)
where 𝑌 is the number of malicious reporting nodes and 𝐾
represents the total number of votes of the malicious report-
ing node(s) about the same reported node. 𝐾 is calculated in
the same way as in the 𝐾-rule used for the spectrum sensing
decision; however this time the node’s decision with a BL
value less than 2.5 counts as a one vote.
Collusive cluster nodes or compromised node(s) can send
false sensing results or report a benign node as misbehaving
node. In the case of targeting a benign node, the collusion
attack occurs if multiple nodes report to CH about a benign
node that this benign node is a “BAD” node while in real
it is not. Our approach prevents any node from acting as
a collusive node or compromised node by analyzing and
comparing the different reports sent by different cluster nodes
about the benign node. In other words, CH applies one
of five different actions to the reported and the reporting
nodes. These actions are A1 (Do nothing), A2 (Increment its
BL), A3 (Decrement its BL), A4 (Decrement its BL after five
nonconsecutive or three consecutive “BAD” reports about its
neighboring reported node), and A5 (Penalize the adversary
node by one of the penalty actions).
4.6. Energy Consumption Analysis. As the cognitive radio
nodes are battery-powered and the sensing process is contin-
uous, energy is consumed during the sensing process and it
should be taken into consideration during the design process
of counter-mechanisms for attacks. The main goal of attacks
detection mechanisms should be maximizing the security
level andminimizing the energy consumption in the network.
Energy consumption is high in the presence of an adver-
sary node (s) that behave in an abnormal way to launch
PUEA or/and SSDF attacks. In other words, each sensing
node consumes more energy to broadcast its own sensing
result, analyze the sensing results of other nodes, and identify
the adversary node(s) in the network in addition to sense the
spectrum correctly.
In the proposed approach, if attackers exist in the net-
work, the false alarm probability increases and the detection
probability decreases leading to higher energy consumption
levels. However, applying the proposed 𝐾-rule and the
penalty mechanism decreases the false alarm probability and
therefore decreases the energy consumption levels as the
adversary nodes do not have enough resources to launch such
attacks.
5. Complexity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the monitoring
nodes behavior algorithm proposed, including the sensing
phase, in terms of computation overhead and communication
overhead. In our proposed algorithm, all SUs are divided
into different clusters and the cluster nodes communicate
with their CHs instead of communicating with a centralized
point (i.e., FC). This reduces the amount of computation and
resource management and, therefore, improves the security
level of the network.
Firstly, we analyze the computation overhead in the pro-
posed approach and in the centralizedmodelwith no clusters.
In the centralized model with no clusters, a bidirectional way
of messaging between all SUs and the FC is used. Therefore,
the FC needs to manipulate 2 ∗ |𝑀| messages, where 𝑀
represents the total number of SUs. In the proposed model
using clusters, the FCmanipulates 2∗|𝐾|, where𝐾 represents
the number of cluster heads.The computation overhead at the
FC in both approaches is ≈ 𝑂(𝑀) and ≈ 𝑂(𝐾), respectively.
However, |𝐾| < |𝑀|; therefore, our approach reduces the
computation overhead at the FC.
In our proposed approach, the number of messages that
theCHhas tomanipulate is |𝑁|messages, where𝑁 represents
the number of SUs in the cluster. Therefore, the computation
overhead at the CH is ≈𝑂(𝑁).
Secondly, we use the number of messages exchanged to
also calculate the communication overhead. The number of
messages is equal to that used in the computation overhead
calculation; therefore, the communication overhead at the FC
with no clustering is ≈ 𝑂(𝑀), at the FC with clustering is ≈𝑂(𝐾), and at the CH is ≈𝑂(𝑁) where |𝐾| < |𝑁| < |𝑀|.
6. Performance Evaluation
We simulate the proposed approach to identify the adversary
sensing nodes during the spectrum sensing phase. Table 3
shows the network simulated with values used for the
parameters required in our approach as in [14–18]. The
simulation results are analyzed from two perspectives. First,
the importance and the effects of the concepts used in the
proposed approach such as (monitoring nodes behavior,
BL, 𝐾-rule, and detection and false alarm probability) are
analyzed as shown in Figures 3–6. Second, a comparison is
made between the proposed approach and other approaches
in the literature in terms of detection probability and false
alarm probability as shown in Figures 7–9. The detection
probability found in (4) in our approach is compared with
that in INCA [26] and with two other approaches as we
refer them as Model A and Model B proposed in [14] and
[15], respectively. Moreover, we compare the false alarm
probability found in (7) in our approach with that in Model
A and Model B [14, 15].
The normal behavior of any cluster node in our proposed
model is illustrated in Figure 3 as each node starts with a
moderate belief level and keeps gaining more belief through
the spectrum sensing phase until it reaches the maximum
belief level of four. All nodes aim at increasing their BL in the
network. On the other hand, the adversary node (even with
a maximum belief level value of four) can have its belief level
decreased to the minimum value of zero due to its abnormal
behavior in the cluster.
The transmission rate in our proposedmodel is compared
with and without monitoring nodes behavior as shown in
Figure 4.We assume that all nodes initially achieve 70 percent
of their desired transmission rate.The behavior of the trusted
nodes, the semimisbehaving nodes, and the full-misbehaving
Security and Communication Networks 11
Table 3: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Number of SUs [0–125]
Number of clusters [0–15]
Number of malicious nodes 3
The rewarding factor 𝛼 0.3
The penalizing factor 𝛽 0.7
BLthreshold
2 (for the spectrum sensing
final decision)
2.5 (for the adversary node
detection)
BLCH [2–4]𝑃𝑑 0.8𝑃𝑓 0.2





















Figure 3: Belief level over time.
node is monitored. The normal behavior of the trusted node
makes its BL increase and therefore, its transmission rate
increases gradually. The semimisbehaving node lures some
nodes in the cluster; therefore, those nodes vote “BAD” while
other nodes vote “GOOD” about its behavior. Overall, its BL
relatively decreases (i.e., |AF| is less than 3) and therefore its
transmission rate decreases.The transmission rate of the full-
misbehaving node that lures all nodes in the cluster decreases
rapidly and its BL reaches zero in a shorter time, since all
the cluster nodes vote “BAD” about its behavior (i.e., |AF| is
greater than 3). The transmission rate of an adversary node
without monitoring its behavior (i.e., no BL associated with
the node’s behavior) is also measured. It is found that its






























Figure 4: Transmission rate over time.
Figure 5 illustrates the effects of the different number of
nodes in a cluster with their BL on the detection probability.
It is depicted that, with a higher BL, the detection probability
increases (i.e., reaches the maximum value of one) due to the
increase in the number of the cooperating SUs. Therefore,
when more SUs that have high BL participate in the sensing
phase, the detection is completed faster.
Figure 6 shows the effects of applying two different 𝐾
rules on the detection probability in our proposed approach.
We assume that the number of SUs in a cluster is 12. In
the first 𝐾-rule (50%), the detection probability reaches the
maximum value of one, when 50% of the users (i.e., six out
of twelve SUs) successfully have the same decision, while



















































Figure 6: Effect of two𝐾 rules on detection probability in proposed
approach.
in our proposed 𝐾-rule, the detection probability reaches
the maximum value of one when fewer users (i.e., four
out of twelve SUs), which have higher BL, make the same
decision. In comparison with the 50% 𝐾-rule, the detection
is completed faster by applying our proposed𝐾-rule.
Figure 7 compares the detection probability in our pro-
posed model, INCA [26], and Models A and B [14, 15]. The
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Figure 8: A comparison of false alarm probability versus percentage
of votes.
detection probability increases when the number of sensing
SU nodes increases. In INCA, the maximum detection prob-
ability is 0.5. In our proposed approach using the proposed𝐾-rule, the detection probability continues to increase to a
maximum value of one, where at least nine out of twenty-one
nodes in the cluster decide that a node is an adversary node
(i.e., number of “BAD” reports B = 9 nodes). The detection
probability in Models A and B keeps increasing; however, it
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Figure 9: A comparison of false alarm probability versus malicious
nodes.
reaches the maximum value of one when all the cluster nodes
participate in the detection process. Therefore, our approach
outperforms the INCA approach as well asModels A and B as
it can reach the maximum value of the detection probability
and in a shorter time.
Figure 8 compares the false alarm probability in our
proposed approach with that in Model A [14] and Model B
[15]. In Model A and Model B, the 50% 𝐾-rule is applied,
while in our proposed model the proposed 𝐾-rule is used to
calculate the percentage of votes. It is clear from the figure
that the false alarm probability decreases as the percentage of
votes (i.e., number of the nodes participating in the spectrum
sensing process) increases. Our proposed model with the
proposed𝐾-rule lowers the false alarm probability compared
to the other two models with a reduction of more than 60%.
Therefore, our proposed approach outperformsModel A and
Model B in terms of lowering the false alarm probability.
In Figure 9, the false alarm probability in our proposed
model is again compared with that in Model A and Model
B, but this time, with respect to the number of malicious
(adversary) nodes in the network. It is depicted from the
figure that our proposed model with the proposed 𝐾-rule
outperforms the other two models when the number of
malicious nodes increases. The punishment scheme applied
by the CH against any malicious node is a possible reason for
this advantage. Lowering the false alarm probability increases
the security of the network.
7. Security Analysis
The proposed model prevents any node from acting in a
misbehaving way. Different attacks that might occur because
of the abnormal behavior of network nodes (adversary nodes)
are eliminated by our proposed collaborative approach. We
show here some attacks that can be detected and mitigated
by our collaborative approach. Note that all the simulation
results of the detection probability and false alarm probability
in the previous section can represent the detection and false
alarm probability of the following attacks separately.
7.1. PUE Attack Analysis. PUEA is launched when one node
emulates the PU by sending signals over PUs channels.When
SUs sense the PUs channels, they will receive signals over
these channels stating that a PU is present in its channels,
while in reality, it is a node that is emulating the real PU.
We assume that there is one node emulating PU and sending
signals over PUs channels and there is no real PU using
the channels. When SUs sense the PUs channels and receive
signals over these channels, each SU compares the received
signals with the expected signals in order to check if the
received signals belong to a real PU or an adversary node
that emulates PU. Based on this comparison, if the sensing
node decides that the spectrum is busy, the malicious node
is performing as an active PUEA; otherwise it is a passive
PUEA. We mitigate both the active and passive PUEA in
our approach by applying the collaboration between the
different sensing nodes, our belief level mechanism, and
making the final sensing decision based on all the sensing
nodes’ decisions and not based on one node’s decision only.
More specifically, by applying our proposed𝐾-out-of-𝑁 rule,
the SU with the higher BL has a higher weight in making the
final decision if the received signal is from a real PU or not.
If a node, after analyzing the received signal, decides that this
received signal belongs to an emulator, it will send a special
sensing-reputation report to its neighbors and CH. CH will
collect these special reputation reports and analyze them to
make the final decision and based on that the passive PUEA
is mitigated. The detection of a PUEA will be faster when the
sensing nodes have higher BL, since the higher BL values give
them higher number of votes.
In the case of 𝑀 SUs sense the spectrum, which have
the maximum BL, the detection of PUEA will be faster than
that when at least one node does not have the maximum BL.
In case all the nodes are new nodes, which are joining the
cluster for the first time (i.e., their BL value is still moderate),
the detection probability will not be high enough in the first
sensing round. However, as the sensing is carried out over
multiple rounds, the BL of the nodes will increase and the
detection probability will continue to increase.
The active PUEA is mitigated by the symmetric cryptog-
raphy, since, a node can emulate a PU if it has its shared
symmetric key with other nodes, which is not the case in
our proposed approach. If a node is an emulating PU, it has
to have the PU’s symmetric key to send messages over the
PUs channels. We simulate a scenario with multiple SUs with
different BLs and show the results in Figure 10. It is depicted
that the detection probability increases as the time increases
and as the BL of the normal behaving nodes increases. A
higher BL of a normal behaving node indicates a faster PUEA
detection.
7.2. SSDF Attack Analysis. The attacker might send false
sensing results to its neighbors stating that the PU is present
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Figure 10: Detection probability of PUEA.
in its band, when in fact the PU is not present. The attacker’s
intention is to gain exclusive access to the spectrum and
to prevent other nodes from using the spectrum efficiently.
Another form of this attack is when the attacker falsely states
that the PU is absent in its band. In this case, the attacker
aims to cause interference with the PU and consequently, the
PU’s QoS is degraded. In both forms, the SSDF might be
active or passive. If a malicious node sends its false sensing
result to other nodes and the final sensing result was the
same as the malicious node’s sensing result, active SSDF
is launched; otherwise SSDF is passive. Our approach will
detect this malicious behavior that leads to active or passive
SSDF by applying the collaboration, BL management, and
monitoring nodes mechanisms (i.e., each node votes about
its neighboring nodes behavior). The final spectrum sensing
decision is made based on all the nodes sensing results and
in different consecutive sensing rounds (i.e., if one node
succeeded to launch SSDF in one sensing round, its chance
for relaunching SSDF decreases in the next sensing rounds).
With active SSDF attack, the malicious behavior of the node
is detected by other nodes that have the opposite sensing
decision. Therefore, the votes’ weight of the malicious node
will be decreased as the sensing time elapse. Moreover, the
CH as a trustworthy node can decide if any node is sending
false sensing results or false reports about other nodes. In the
case of passive SSDF attack, monitoring nodes’ behavior and
analysis of their behavior, which is done by the CH, reduce
the nodes’ BL and their votes’ weight; hence, passive SSDF is
mitigated.
All the nodes will rely on CH’s final decision about the
spectrum availability. According to our analysis, a malicious
node’s chance to launch the SSDF attack is high when the
node has a high BL or fewer nodes decide that a node is a
malicious node. On the other hand, this chance decreases
when the number of nodes that decide if a node is amalicious
node increases (i.e., when themalicious node’s BL decreases).
During the reporting rounds, the number of nodes, which
decide that a node is a malicious node, increases if the
malicious node’s sensing results oppose their sensing results,
and therefore the malicious node’s BL decreases with the
reporting time elapse. When the malicious node sends false
reports to the CH, the other cluster nodes will vote “BAD” for
it and consequently, its BL is decreased.
7.3. DoS Attack Analysis. It might be launched at the CH,
since a joining node might show a good behavior at the
joining time to become a CH, and then it acts abnormally
and cheats about the honesty of other nodes. This adversary
joining node aims to reduce the other nodes’ belief level
value and reduce the network throughput. Such a behavior is
prevented by our proposed approach as the clusters are being
dynamically reformed whenever a new node is admitted to
the network or when a node has a BL that is higher than
the CH’s BL. Therefore, the cluster heads are not fixed all the
time. Moreover, each normal behaving cluster node that is
penalized by its malicious CH contacts the FC, which takes
appropriate actions against the malicious CH.
It might be launched at SU level as an SU might send
any sensing result about the spectrum to its neighbors or
send “BAD” reports about its neighboring nodes in order to
degrade their QoS and prevent them from achieving their
desired service. It is prevented by applying our proposed
reports analysis and punishment mechanisms, as any node,
which sends false sensing information or false opinion about
other nodes, will be punished with proper penalty action
depending on the severity of the launched DoS attack. Every
node is monitored and its behavior is evaluated at the end of
every reporting round. Therefore, for any node to stay in the
network and keep using its resources, it has to act normally
in the network.
7.4. Objective Function Attack Analysis. The attacker tries
to change the radio parameters (such as center frequency,
bandwidth, power, modulation type, coding rate, channel
access protocol, encryption type, and frame size) to reduce
the network objective, which is always to have higher security
and higher transmission rate. Any change in these parameters
will lead to false sensing results of other nodes andmight lead
to launch PUE attack. However, by applying our proposed
BLmanagement scheme and penalty mechanism, a node will
not have the opportunity to change any of these parameters.
Our proposed approach reduces the resources assigned to
the misbehaving node, which reduces the opportunity for
the misbehaving node to change the radio parameters. If
a node launches this attack, other nodes will notify CH
about the abnormal behavior of this node. Therefore, CH
applies appropriate penalty actions, such as deallocating part
of the resources, which weakens its ability to perform such an
attack.
7.5. Collusion Attack Analysis. As the collusive reporting
node sends false reports about its neighboring node(s), CH
Security and Communication Networks 15
uses the reports sent by its next node(s) to determine the
correctness of its reports. Incorrect reports are determined
upon the comparison of the reports sent by the reporting
node, other nodes’ reports, and CH’s sensing decision itself.
Such a comparison leads to identify the compromised and
collusive nodes in the network. No node will like to have
its belief level reduced or be considered as compromised or
collusive node. By the role of CH and applying the penalty
scheme, a node will send true reports about its neighboring
node(s) and will not send false reports to protect itself from
being penalized or considered as a collusive or compromised
node.
Another form of collusion attack is when multiple nodes
agreed about reporting a benign node as a “BAD” node, when
the node is not “BAD.” When CH receives the reputation
reports from the collusive nodes about the benign node, it
analyzes the reports sent by the collusive nodes about the
benign node and the reports sent by the benign node about
the collusive. Based on that analysis, CH can tell if the “BAD”
reports are true or false reports. Consequently, the CH takes
the appropriate actions against the collusive nodes or the
misbehaving node. Hence, detecting the collusive nodes will
become easier and faster with time as the BL of the collusive
nodes will be decreased. As a result, their reports will have no
high effect on other benign nodes.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
Securing the spectrum sensing process in CRN is very
important as adversary nodes might behave in different
abnormal ways to launch different attacks that degrade the
spectrum sensing reliability. Therefore, the network security
and throughput will be reduced. Current mechanisms of
attack detection focus on addressing the attacks indepen-
dently or two kinds of attacks a time, which is not realistic,
as multiple attacks can exist simultaneously.
Monitoring nodes behavior during the spectrum sensing
process helps to identify and eliminate adversary nodes from
the network, which improves the accuracy of the sensing
results, the network security, and the performance.
In this paper, we propose a collaborative approach during
the spectrum sensing process that focuses on monitoring
the nodes’ behavior rather than addressing the attacks them-
selves. It works as a proactive approach to passive attacks
and as a reactive approach to active attacks. In the proposed
approach, all sensing nodes monitor the behavior of each
other to identify the adversary nodes.
The simulation results show the performance of our
proposed approach compared to othermodels.This approach
improves the detection probability and false alarm proba-
bility, which increases the network security and implicitly
enhances the spectrum utilization and network throughput.
Moreover, the security analysis shows the different kind of
active and passive attacks that can be detected and mitigated
through the proposed approach by monitoring the sensing
nodes behavior.
As future directions to this work, the energy efficiency
of the proposed approach will be addressed. Moreover,
the trade-off between the required security level and the
energy consumption in the network should be identified.
As the proposed approach is a reputation-based technique,
its performance will be compared to other reputation-based
mechanisms in order to show its efficiency and its added
value.
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